

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES  
FOREIGN POLICY BE TOWARDS TAIWAN?

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## ABSTRACT

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This study explores what is in the best interest of the United States with regard to a declared Taiwan policy. It details current and historical relations between the United States and China and explores China's relationship with and influence over its regional neighbors, and the influence it now exhibits with growing economic, political and military power. The significant issues affecting the U.S.-China relationship are: China's role in the World Trade Organization; China's need to be seen as a rational world actor, China's conventional and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) military programs, and China's relationship to the two Koreas and its possible role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The paper explores policy options that will insure the protection of U.S. vital interests in the region and addresses alternative courses of action concluding that we should view China as a strategic partner but nonetheless use appropriate measures to prevent its dominance in East Asia.



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## WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY BE TOWARDS TAIWAN?

For years the United States has maintained a purposefully ambiguous policy toward the defense of Taiwan. This policy became somewhat less vague when President George W. Bush stated on April 25, 2001, that the United States would do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself”.<sup>1</sup> On December 9, 2003 during a meeting with Peoples Republic of China Premier Wen Jiabao, President Bush reiterated that the United States opposed any unilateral moves by either China or Taiwan to change the current status quo.<sup>2</sup> Did this signify a change in U. S. policy or simply state what the United States had implied all along; that the United States was willing to defend Taiwan using military means? Since these statements, both Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage have made statements supporting a “one China policy”, specifically that the United States did not support the independence efforts of Taiwan from China, and that the United States (as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act), is obligated to maintain sufficient forces in the area to deter an attack, not defend.<sup>3</sup> These seemingly opposing policy statements are characteristic of how we have defined our foreign policy for years with regards to China over the Taiwan issue. This paper will explore the issues surrounding our relations with China and Taiwan and will explore the best policy for the United States to adopt in defending the sovereignty of Taiwan.

### UNITED STATES GOALS

At the forefront of United States foreign policy are the interests as defined in the current National Security Strategy, in which President Bush clearly lays out the goals of the United States: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.<sup>4</sup> He further states in order to achieve these goals the United States will:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity.
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
- Work with other to defuse regional conflicts.
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction.
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.

- Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.<sup>5</sup>

Specifically, with regard to China, the National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of engaging China to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.<sup>6</sup> China is also said to be important in our current War on Terrorism, promoting stability on the Korean peninsula; a strategically important trade partner; key in resolving the Taiwan issue; and plays a significant role in two other key concerns: human rights and weapons nonproliferation.<sup>7</sup>

Another important document in guiding U.S. regional policy is the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. In this document, the United States stated very clearly our goals are to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan.<sup>8</sup>

## **UNITED STATES - TAIWAN RELATIONS**

To understand the current issues surrounding our China-Taiwan policy, one must first understand the historical context. Chinese immigration to Taiwan started as early as 500 A.D. with Chinese prefecture rule being established over the island by the Qing Dynasty from 1680-1875. Taiwan was made a separate Chinese province in 1887, but as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoskei in 1895, China was ceded to and was ruled by Japan until the end of World War II.<sup>9</sup> In October 1949, after 15 years of civil war, the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.) formed a communist state on Mainland China and Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese (Kuo Min Tang, or K.M.T.) established a provisional government on Taiwan.<sup>10</sup>

Taiwan was widely recognized as the de facto official government of China until 1971, when it was replaced in the United Nations by the People's Republic of China. It was not until January 1, 1979 that the United States (in a Joint Communiqué with the P.R.C.) recognized the Peoples Republic of China as the official government ruling China and "acknowledged" the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of "One China."<sup>11</sup> The current United States policy is guided by the three United States-China Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.<sup>12</sup> The 1972 Shanghai Communiqué paved the way for normalization of United States-China relations and affirmed the United States interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue; the 1979 Normalization Communiqué reaffirmed the United States interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and further stated that the Taiwan situation is to be settled by the Chinese



themselves; and finally in the 1982 Joint Communiqué the United States once again emphasized that China must strive for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.<sup>13</sup>

The Taiwan Relations Act created domestic legal authority for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan.<sup>14</sup> On April 10, 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed this Act into law.<sup>15</sup> The United States sells military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the subsequent 1982 United States-Peoples Republic of China Joint Communiqué.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, in the 1982 Communiqué, the United States stated that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales with Taiwan; it also states that the sales will not exceed established quantitative and qualitative levels and that the United States intends to gradually reduce its arms sales.<sup>17</sup>

The Taiwan Relations Act stipulates that the United States will provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive nature and also specifies the United States will maintain the capacity to resist any threats to Taiwan's security, social, or economic systems.<sup>18</sup> Interaction between Taiwan and the United States is facilitated through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and its counterpart, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the United States.<sup>19</sup> Taiwan is primarily equipped with U.S. weaponry, and in the last ten years arms sales from the United States to Taiwan have been significant. Deliveries of U.S. defense articles and services were \$4 Billion from 1993-1996, and increased to \$7.6 Billion from 1997-2000.<sup>20</sup> In April 2001, President Bush approved Taiwan's request for the following defense articles: 8 diesel-electric submarines; 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft; 54 Mark-48 torpedoes; 44 Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; 144 M109A6 Paladin howitzers; and a variety of other articles. He also approved the sale of 4 decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers (as excess defense articles).<sup>21</sup> The approval of this sale does not necessarily equate to direct acquisition, as Taiwan's defense budget has dropped over the past ten years from 4.75% to 2.6% as a percentage of GDP (Taiwan's defense budget for FY04 is (US)\$7.62 Billion).<sup>22</sup> Taiwan will have to make the decision to appropriate more money into their defense budget in order to purchase these items from the United States. Although the Pentagon has given its approval of this sale, the State Department has purposefully delayed sending the necessary letter of notification to Congress. The delay is the result of expressed concern by the Taiwan legislature that this procurement of weapons may further cause cross-strait tensions.<sup>23</sup> China's open opposition to this sale is also of concern given the fact that the United States is actively engaging China's help in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.<sup>24</sup>

The Bush administration has also continued to strengthen diplomatic ties with Taiwan, granting unprecedented visits by Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming to the U.S. –Taiwan

Business Council in March 2002 and by Vice Minister of Defense Kang Ning-hsiang to the Pentagon in September 2002.<sup>25</sup>

## **UNITED STATES – CHINA RELATIONS**

Before addressing the objectives through which the United States should pursue its national interests in the region, it is important to address the key issue regarding Taiwan: China. Many believed that President Nixon's 1972 historic trip to China signified an awakening of relations between the United States and China and a possible counter to the Soviet Union's expansionist threat.<sup>26</sup> The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident changed this optimistic perception and also triggered a European Union arms embargo that is still in place today.<sup>27</sup> During the 1990s, China experienced significant economic and military advancements. These advancements, coupled with China's diplomatic efforts and accession into the World Trade Organization have overshadowed the Tiananmen Square incident and caused the European Union to re-look its embargo. China's cooperation with the Bush Administration after the attacks on September 11 and the role China is taking in resolving the North Korea issues are also raising China's prestige in international relations.

The United States-China economic ties have expanded significantly over the past 20 years, rising from \$5 Billion in 1980 to over \$181 Billion in 2003.<sup>28</sup> China is now the United States' third largest trading partner accounting for 3.9% to total U.S. exports.<sup>29</sup> It is foreseeable that China possibly could become the United States' largest commercial trading partner in the future.

After 15 years of negotiations, China was granted membership in the World Trade Organization in December 2001.<sup>30</sup> Although this was a major step forward, China has been slow to resolve important trade issues. Most significant to the United States are China's pegging of its currency to the U.S. dollar, making U.S. exports to China more expensive and imports from China cheaper; China's restrictive tariff and non tariff barriers on goods, services and foreign investment; and China's failure to protect intellectual property rights.<sup>31</sup> Even though China argues that it has been slow to act because these policies ensure economic growth, essential to its political stability, China is starting to receive pressure from the world community to comply with World Trade Organization regulations and policies. China is struggling with the dilemma of needing and wanting to be part of the global market while balancing its economic prosperity with internal stability, which it believes requires resistance to a free and open society.

China's military power is also rapidly expanding, although it is dwarfed by U.S. defense spending and technological advancements.<sup>32</sup> China has made significant purchases of over 2

billion dollars worth of Russian military arms in the past four years. These arms purchases, along with domestically produced arms, are aimed at preventing Taiwan from any separatist activities. In 2003, the Council of Foreign Relations task force predicted that China will overtake Japan in the next decade or two to become Asia's major regional military power and further warned that the Taiwan Straits is an area of near-term military concern.<sup>33</sup> Although China is most likely several decades away from matching U.S. military technology and superiority, China's poses a significant threat to the region and a challenge to U.S. influence in the region.

China's possession and proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction are also of concern to the United States. China is thought to have provided such technologies to Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea and is thought to be significantly upgrading its own long range missile capabilities.<sup>34</sup> This transfer of technologies to other countries poses a significant threat to global security. Although past transactions cannot be undone, China now has a role to play in global security and keeping these weapons in check.

Possibly the most significant impact China has exerted on Asia is through its foreign policy. China's geographic location, growing economic and military power, and multilateral engagements within Asia are significantly strengthening its diplomatic position. China borders on 15 different countries and is taking a much more diplomatic approach in dealing with these countries no matter what the size.<sup>35</sup> Current Chinese diplomatic efforts appear focused on the following long term objectives:

- To foster a secure foreign policy environment while sustaining economic development and political stability.
- To promote economic exchanges that assist China's economic development.
- To calm regional fears and ensure regional neighbors on how it will use its rising power and influence.
- To boost its regional and global power and influence.
- To isolate Taiwan internationally.
- To secure advance arms and military technologies despite a Western embargo.<sup>36</sup>

Lastly, China has struggled with its ability to master "soft power."<sup>37</sup> China's dilemma appears to reside in its resistance to open its society to outside scrutiny and wanting to be considered an international viable entity.

## **CURRENT U.S. POLICY**

In a congressional testimony held on April 21, 2004, James A. Kelley (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) laid out our core principles in regard to China/Taiwan policy:

- The United States remains committed to our one China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act;
- The U.S. does not support independence for Taiwan or unilateral moves that would change the status quo as we define it;
- For Beijing, this means no use of force or threat to use force against Taiwan. For Taipei, it means exercising prudence in managing all aspects of Cross-Strait relations. For both sides, it means no statements or actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status;
- The U.S. will continue the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act; and
- Viewing any use of force against Taiwan with grave concern, we will maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.<sup>38</sup>

The November 2004 meeting between President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leader's Meeting in Santiago, Chile was significant. Both Presidents laid out their regional concerns and interests in detail, particularly regarding the Taiwan issue. In contrast to his 2001 statement, President Bush affirmed that the United States maintains a "one China Policy" in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the three United States-China Communiqués, and that the United States opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo.<sup>39</sup> He also expressed concerns over China's missile deployments aimed at Taiwan, urged China to seek a peaceful resolution, and promised he would not send inconsistent messages in the future to Taiwan thus not directly encouraging their desires for independence.<sup>40</sup> President Hu said his country seeks peaceful reunification through its "one country-two systems" policy and said that Taiwan's independence is a danger to the peace and security of the entire region.<sup>41</sup> Lastly, the two leaders acknowledged their commitment to the six-party talks and to the elimination of nuclear weapons in North Korea.<sup>42</sup>

## **ENDS/WAYS/MEANS**

These are U.S. national interests in the Asia-Pacific region, derived from the current U.S. National Security Strategy.

- Peace and stability throughout the region, diplomatic trust and cordial relations
- Free and open societies
- Access to trade and markets
- Basic freedoms and human rights assurances
- Support for democracies
- Continued support for the War on Terrorism
- A free and non-nuclear Korean peninsula
- Weapons nonproliferation<sup>43</sup>

The U.S. Army War College uses the model illustrated below for formulating strategy that consists of ends (strategic objectives), ways (strategic concepts), and means (resources).

Using this model we are concerned with the ways to employ the means to achieve the ends.<sup>44</sup>

<i>Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means.</i>	
<i>Component</i>	<i>Definition</i>
<b>Ends</b>	<i>Objectives towards which one strives</i>
<b>Ways</b>	<i>Course of Action</i>
<b>Means</b>	<i>Instruments by which some end can be achieved</i>

TABLE 1.

## ENDS

Specifically for China, the United States seeks political, economic and social reforms. A free and open society within China facilitates access to trade and commerce. As stated earlier, China possesses a vast market that would greatly enhance our own economic viability. Highlighted during the Tiananmen Square incident, the United States seeks significant human rights reforms within China. China's continued repression of social reforms is not in keeping with acceptable global standards and must be rectified. The United States also seeks to eliminate China's proliferation of weapons, particularly Weapons of Mass Destruction. China's past proliferation has influenced the balance of power in other regions and is undermining global security. Additionally, the United States recognizes that China is key to resolving the North Korea issue and its willingness to participate in this effort is promising.

Although the United States supports a peaceful diplomatic solution to the Taiwan issue, Taiwan's democratic free and open society represents the form of government we favor to support throughout the globe. The United States' dilemma rests in its ability to diplomatically engage China while simultaneously supporting Taiwan. This support to Taiwan demonstrates

our resolve to our allies and other democracies. Ultimately the United States seeks a free and democratic government in Taiwan with cordial diplomatic relations with China.

## WAYS

### **Diplomatic**

There are many methods the United States could employ to achieve our objectives. Diplomatic assurances to both China and Taiwan of our intentions as stated in the Taiwan Relations Act and the three Joint Communiqués can foster better relations. Although one can assume China believes the United States does not have hostile direct intentions against its territorial claims, President Bush's stern response to President Chen Shui-bian's "one country on each side" statement is a good example of the diplomatic assurances.<sup>45</sup> Actions such as these allowed China to see that we do not and will not support a declaration of independence by Taiwan and, more importantly, dissuades Taiwan from unilaterally altering the strategic conditions of East Asia. The United States could also continue to encourage Taiwan to maintain a cross-strait dialog. A peaceful resolution between Beijing and Taipei is our stated policy. But at the same time, we could continue to engage Taiwan, as we have in the past, allowing us access to its markets and demonstrating our resolve to other growing democracies around the world. We could also increase the engagement dialog between the United States and China; continued bi-lateral interaction could foster better relations. This dialog could include more informal diplomatic and military exchanges. Our goal would be to influence China's international actions so as to further our own interests.

The United States has many bi-lateral relationships within Asia that could be continued. Having other Asian strategic partners provides a counterbalance to China in Asia.

### **Financial/Economic/Informational**

The extensive Taiwan investments in Mainland China are facilitating good diplomatic relations between Taiwan and China. Taiwan is the world's third largest holder of foreign currency reserves, America's eighth largest trading partner, and the world's seventeenth largest economy.<sup>46</sup> As such, Taiwan has invested heavily in mainland China (estimated at over \$70 Billion).<sup>47</sup> China is now Taiwan's top-trading partner: Trade between the two countries was over \$46 Billion in 2003.<sup>48</sup> To be prudent, Taiwan adopted a "no haste, be patient, and go south" investment policy to slow the investments flowing into China.<sup>49</sup> More than 50% of China's information technology production is generated by facilities run by Taiwan companies; this has allowed China to become the second largest information hardware producer. This is

strategically important because China is increasingly becoming more economically dependent on Taiwan and not the other way around.<sup>50</sup> The implication is that a direct attack by China on Taiwan would be an attack on the Chinese economy. This does not guarantee that China will not attack Taiwan if provoked, but one would assume that the more China becomes dependent on Taiwan's investments and economy, the less likely they will be to initiate an armed intervention (short of Taiwan declaring independence).

As stated earlier, China's membership in the World Trade Organization is a significant accomplishment and important strategic factor that China must weigh in its future decisions. Although not fully compliant, China is now tied to a global economy and is expected to act within established rules. The United States could diplomatically leverage this global influence to ensure China does act within globally acceptable standards (i.e. does not take unilateral actions to reunify Taiwan, discontinues WMD proliferation, resolves the North Korea issue, etc.).

### **Military**

Given Taiwan's geographic location and China's current capabilities, the defense of Taiwan is primarily achieved through both naval and air power. This is reflected in U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan, as evident in the April 2001 defense package. If diplomatic actions fail and conflict seems likely, possible deterrence to aggression could also include the deployment of Carrier Strike Groups, an Expeditionary Strike Group, and Air Force deployments to established bases in the region. In the event of a Chinese attack, the United States could also provide supplies and equipment directly to Taiwan during the conflict. A direct military response by the United States would most likely come from the Carrier Strike Groups and land-based strike aircraft. Lastly, the United States could deploy Special Operations and other ground forces in defense of Taiwan. These actions depend on the United States continuing to engage and fostering good relations with countries throughout the region. Basing rights and the possibility of coalition support within the region provide further deterrence to Chinese unilateral actions.

### **MEANS**

There is a variety of resources that would be involved in support of these ends and ways and most have already been expressed previously. These means include forces, equipment, funding, non-government agencies, international institutions, and so on.

Ultimately, the United States seeks a peaceful and non military resolution to the problems within the region. The continued use of foreign military sales, bilateral agreements, basing

rights, military deployments, ship visits, and excess defense articles are viable options and levers of employment.

## **RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION**

There are three courses of actions that the United States could pursue with China in support of Taiwan. The first is to pursue the Bush 2001 stated policy that the United States “will do whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty; second the United States could withdraw from the stated promise of direct military action while still providing arms in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act; or, third, the United States could maintain a purposefully ambiguous policy regarding the defense of Taiwan.

The “whatever it takes” policy, as stated by the President in April 2001, drew worldwide reaction and put China on notice that any military or other strong arm tactics toward Taiwan would provoke the United States to respond militarily in Taiwan’s defense. This had two unfortunate effects on the countries involved: it provoked an adverse reaction from China and it took some of the onus away from Taiwan to provide for its own defense and subsequently allowed Taiwan to be more vocal in its quest for independence. This provocation of China did not enhance our security, nor was it in our best interest. Even though President Bush has referred to China as a strategic competitor and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has identified China as the primary future strategic threat, it is in our best interest to continue cordial diplomatic relations with China.<sup>51</sup> Specifically, we must continue to engage China concerning regional issues. China is key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and could play a critical role someday in Korean peninsula reunification. Since China is a growing power in Asia, it is imperative that we maintain strong diplomatic relations. More importantly, we must not unnecessarily exclude our access to the vast market that China possesses.

The United States’ second option is to provide only economic and military equipment aid if China attacks. We are currently providing military armaments in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. In the event of a Chinese attack, the aid could consist of additional arms, supplies, and humanitarian commodities that Taiwan would require: assistance short of direct U.S. military action. Although some argue that China does not currently have the naval capacity to support a direct invasion, it is neither in the U.S. national interest nor in the interest of our Asian strategic partners (primarily Japan) for Taiwan to go it alone. Short of invasion, China does possess a significant missile threat that could devastate Taiwan. If the United States commits to a policy of non-direct military support, we would also be sending a dangerous



message to our long-standing allies that the United States may not be a reliable bi-lateral partner.

The third course of action and our once long-standing policy is somewhat of an ambiguous policy. The Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States would consider any effort to determine Taiwan's future by other than peaceful means a grave threat, that the United States would provide Arms of a defensive character to Taiwan, and the United States will maintain the capacity to resist any use of force threatening the security of Taiwan.<sup>52</sup> Although defending Taiwan seems explicit, the policy of the United States remained ambiguous as to whether this would constitute direct military action by the United States. This somewhat ambiguous policy facilitates diplomatic and military flexibility and is the course of action that the United States should pursue. This policy fosters cordial diplomatic relations, facilitates the pursuit of our regional interests, and allows the United States to engage China to resolve regional issues. As stated earlier, recent statements made by both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell in November 2004 suggest a possible return to the ambiguous policy towards the defense of Taiwan. Nonetheless, while our declared policy should be one of ambiguity, China has made it clear on several occasions that they deem Taiwan a vital national interest, as such, there is little question whether or not China would use force if Taiwan declared independence.<sup>53</sup> The United States must be willing to provide direct military action in order to defend Taiwan against an unprovoked attack.

## **CONCLUSION**

It is in the long-term national interest of the United States to develop and maintain a cordial diplomatic relationship with Beijing and to return to the ambiguous policy regarding the defense of Taiwan. It is also in the national interest of the United States to defend Taiwan militarily against an attack by China. No one can predict how China will act, if and when it becomes the hegemonic power in Asia, nor can one predict with reasonable certainty whether it is in the United States best interest for China to achieve hegemonic status. What is clear is that a policy that promotes outwardly hostile actions towards China will not foster a good diplomatic and economic relationship between the United States and China. A breakdown in relations between the United States and China could result in a situation similar to that in which we found ourselves with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics after World War II.

There do remain significant economic and political issues that must be overcome before the United States should engage China as an equal partner. China must show its resolve in complying with World Trade Organizations rules and also allow equal access to its own

markets. China's continued oppression of humanitarian rights and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are significant issues that must be resolved. China's dilemma lies in its desire to take a leading role in the international community without fully complying with established international standards.

Our continued support for Taiwan is a demonstration to our Allies of our resolve. Taiwan is an Asian democratic success story and we must continue to defend such governments in order to preserve our own future way of life. By cordially engaging China as a strategic partner and peer competitor, we have a better chance of possibly influencing and predicting how China will act. A policy of ambiguity in the defense of Taiwan provides the United States the most flexibility and is the policy the United States should continue to pursue.

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## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Kelly Wallace, "China Registers Diplomatic Protest to U.S.," 25 April 2001; available from <<http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/25/bush.taiwan.01/>>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004, 1. This comment was in keeping with his stance during the Presidential Election debate on March 2, 2000, where he said "If China decides to use force, the United States must help Taiwan defend itself...The Chinese can figure out what that means, but that's going to mean a resolute stand on my part."

<sup>2</sup> James A. Kelley, "Overview of U.S. Policy toward Taiwan," 21 April 2004; available from <<http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 September 2004, 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8*, sec. 2(a), 96<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1979; available from <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2813.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 September 2004.

<sup>4</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 1-2.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> *Taiwan Relations Act*.

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Background Note: Taiwan*, December 2002; available from <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2813.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 September 2004, 3.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 9. The United States first acknowledged the Chinese position in the first Shanghai Communiqué of 28 February 1972. The 1 January 1979 communiqué also stated that the United States would continue unofficial relations with Taiwan.

<sup>12</sup> Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "The Bush Administration and Taiwan," 6 February 2004; available from <<http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/2004/DVH-0204.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Department of State, 9.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. The U.S. never gave a date for when it would stop selling Arms to Taiwan.

<sup>18</sup> Shirley A. Kan, *Report to Congress, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990*, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 18 April 2003), 1.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of State, 9.

<sup>20</sup> Kan, 2.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>22</sup> Kelly, 4. Although the President has approved the sale of these items, Taiwan is not in a position to purchase all the items anytime in the near future.

<sup>23</sup> Walter Pincus, "End to Arms Sale Delay Sought," 2 February 2005; available from <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55390-2005Feb1.html>>; Internet; accessed 5 March 2005, 1.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Kan, 4.

<sup>26</sup> Robert Sutter, "Why Does China Matter," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2003-2004): 75 [database on-line]; available from Columbia International Affairs Online; accessed 15 January 2004.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>28</sup> Wayne M. Morrison, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress, China-U.S. Trade Issues* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 3 November 2004), 1.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>32</sup> Sutter, 81.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>37</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power," 10 January 2003; available from <[http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/nye\\_soft\\_power\\_iht\\_011003.htm](http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2003/nye_soft_power_iht_011003.htm)>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2005. The term soft power was coined by Harvard Professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr. to refer to the kinds of influence based on culture and values as opposed to the hard power based on economic and military strength.

<sup>38</sup> Kelly, 1.

<sup>39</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, "Slips of the Tongue and Parables," *Pacific Forum CSIS: Comparative Connections*, 4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2004; available from <[http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0404Qus\\_china.html](http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0404Qus_china.html)>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2005, 4.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Bush, 27-28.

<sup>44</sup> Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *War, National Security Policy and Strategy*, volume II (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Department of National Security and Strategy, 25 August – 22 October 2004): 71-72.

<sup>45</sup> Thomas J. Christensen and Michael A. Glosny, "Sources of Stability in U.S.-China Security Relations," in *Strategic Asia 2003-2004, Fragility and Crisis*, ed. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg. (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003), 61.

<sup>46</sup> Kelley, 6.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>51</sup> Chris Rahman, "Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters," *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2001): 82 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 8 October 2004.

<sup>52</sup> *Taiwan Relations Act*.

<sup>53</sup> Kelly, 2.



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